We provide a generalization of Harsanyi (1955) 
Introduction
Harsanyi (1955)'s aggregation theorem establishes that when individuals and society have expected utility preferences over lotteries, society's preferences can be represented by a weighted sum of individual utilities as soon as a Pareto indifference condition is satisfied. This celebrated result has become a cornerstone of social choice theory, being a positive aggregation result in a field where impossibility results are the rule, and is viewed by many as a strong argument in favor of utilitarianism.
Harsanyi's result sparked a rich (and on-going) debate about both its formal structure and substantive content (for an overview see, among others, Sen, 1986; Weymark, 1991; Mongin and d'Aspremont, 1998; Fleurbaey and Mongin, 2012 ). An important question, in particular, is how robust the result is to more general preference specifications. Most findings on this issue are negative. For instance, Seidenfeld, Kadane, and Schervish (1989) and Mongin (1995) proved that moving from (objective) expected utility preferences over lotteries to subjective expected utility preferences over acts results in an impossibility unless all individuals share the same beliefs. Gajdos, Tallon, and Vergnaud (2008) showed that this impossibility extends even to the common belief case whenever individual preferences are not necessarily neutral towards ambiguity (as are subjective expected utility preferences).
In this note we take issue with the assumption of complete preferences. There are at least two reasons why one may want to allow for incomplete preferences in social choice theory. First, individuals may sometimes be intrinsically indecisive, i.e. unable to rank alternatives (Aumann, 1962; Bewley, 1986; Ok, 2002; Dubra, Maccheroni, and Ok, 2004; Ok, Ortoleva, and Riella, 2012) . Second, even if individuals all have complete preferences, these preferences may in practice be only partially identified (Manski, 2005 (Manski, , 2011 . As we shall see, Paretian aggregation remains possible when individual have incomplete expected utility preferences over lotteries, and still has a utilitarian flavor, although in a generalized sense.
Statement of the theorem
Let X be a finite set of outcomes and P denote the set of all probability distributions (lotteries) over X. A utility function on X is an element of R X . We denote by e ∈ R X the constant utility function x → e(x) = 1. Dubra, Maccheroni, and Ok (2004) show that a (weak) preference relation over P satisfies the reflexivity, transitivity, independence, and continuity axioms if and only if it admits an expected multi-utility representation, i.e. a closed and convex set U ⊆ R X such that for all p, q ∈ P ,
and that, moreover, cl(cone(U ) + {γe} γ∈R ) is unique. 1 These are the standard axioms of the expected utility model (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944) , except that completeness is weakened to reflexivity (and continuity is slightly strengthened). Thus, given these axioms, is complete if and only if U can be taken to be a singleton, i.e. a standard expected utility representation, which is then unique up to positive affine transformations.
Call an expected multi-utility representation U regular if cone(U + {γe} γ∈R ) is closed.
Any preference relation admitting an expected multi-utility representation also admits a regular one (and any expected utility representation is obviously regular), so we may without loss of generality restrict attention to such representations. Consider a society made of a finite set {1, . . . , I} of individuals. Each individual i = 1, . . . , I is endowed with a (weak) preference relation i over P satisfying the above axioms. Society itself is also endowed with a preference relation 0 over P satisfying these axioms. For all i = 0, . . . , I, denote by i and ∼ i the asymmetric (strict preference) and symmetric (indifference) parts of i , respectively. Say that the preference profile ( i )
Harsanyi ( in the expected utility setting, Pareto indifference (resp. preference) is necessary and sufficient for the social utility function to consist of a signed utilitarian (resp. utilitarian) aggregation of individual utility functions. More generally, let us now endow i with an expected multi-utility representation U i for all i = 0, . . . , I. This allows for preference incompleteness at both the individual and social level. We then obtain the following generalization of Harsanyi's aggregation theorem (whose proof is presented in the Appendix).
Theorem. Let i be a preference relation over P endowed with a regular expected multi-utility representation U i , for all 1, . . . , I. 
satisfies Pareto preference if and only if
for some closed set Ω ⊆ R
Thus, in the expected multi-utility setting, Pareto indifference (resp. preference) is necessary and sufficient for the set of social utility functions to consist of a set of biutilitarian (resp. utilitarian) aggregations of individual utility functions. Bi-utilitarianism aggregates two utility functions u i and v i for each individual i = 1, . . . , I, the former with a non-negative weight α i and the latter with a non-positive weight −β i , thereby generalizing signed utilitarianism (which corresponds to the particular case where u i = v i for all i = 1, . . . , I).
Comments
Bi-utilitarianism cannot in general be reduced to signed utilitarianism in part (a) of the theorem, as the following example shows. Let X = {x, y, z, w}, I = 2, U 0 = {u 0 }, U 1 = {u 1 }, and U 2 = conv({u 
is not innocuous in terms of preference (unlike the regularity assumption on all U i 's), but there are at least two cases where it is automatically satisfied (details are provided in the appendix). The first is when i satisfies an additional finiteness axiom for all i = 1 . . . , I (Dubra and Ok, 2002) . The second is when ( i ) I i=1 satisfies a minimal agreement condition. If i is complete and endowed with an expected utility representation u i for all i = 1, . . . , I, then (1) reduces to U 0 = { I i=1 θ i u i + γe : (θ, γ) ∈ Λ} for some closed and convex set Λ ⊆ R I × R, and (2) to the same with Λ ⊆ R I + × R. On the other hand, if 0 is complete and endowed with an expected utility representation u 0 , then (1) reduces to
Harsanyi's aggregation theorem is the intersection of these two particular cases. (Danan, Gajdos, and Tallon, 2012) . This latter principle, however, also implies that
It is an open problem to find weaker conditions allowing society to make a selection within the individual sets of utility functions (thereby reducing social incompleteness) while retaining the separation between weights and utilities.
Appendix Proof of the theorem
The "if" statements of both parts of the theorem are obvious, so we only prove the "only if" statements. To this end we first recall the following result from Dubra, Maccheroni, and Ok (2004) .
Lemma. A preference relation over P admits an expected multi-utility representation if and only if there exists a closed and convex cone K ⊆ R X , K ⊥ {γe} γ∈R , such that for all p, q ∈ P , p q ⇔ p − q ∈ K. 6 Moreover, K is unique, and a closed and convex set U ⊆ R X is an expected multi-utility representation of if and only if cl(cone(U ) + {γe} γ∈R ) = K * .
7
We start with part (b), so assume
satisfies Pareto preference. It is sufficient to show that for all u 0 ∈ U 0 , there exist θ ∈ R I + , γ ∈ R, and u i ∈ U i for all i = 1, . . . , I such that u 0 = I i=1 θ i u i + γe. Indeed, if this claim is correct then the set satisfies (2) by construction and is closed with convex θ-sections and convex (u i ) I i=1 -sections since U 0 is closed and convex.
To prove the claim, let K i be the closed and convex cone corresponding to i in the lemma above, for all i = 0, . . . , I. We then have ∩ (Rockafellar, 1970, Corollary 16.4.2) . Moreover, for all i = 0, . . . , I, since U i is regular we also have K * i = cone(U i ) + {γe} γ∈R by the lemma above. Hence
where the last equality follows from the assumption that
Hence for all u 0 ∈ U 0 , there exist γ ∈ R and u i ∈ cone(U i ) for all i = 1, . . . , I such that u 0 = I i=1 u i + γe. Moreover, for all i = 1, . . . , I, since U i is convex we also have u i = θ i u i for some θ i ∈ R + and u i ∈ U i and, hence, u 0 = I i=1 θ i u i + γe. Now for part (a), assume ( i ) I i=0 satisfies Pareto indifference. As in part (b) it is sufficient to show that for all u 0 ∈ U 0 , there exist α, β ∈ R I + , γ ∈ R, and u i , v i ∈ U i for all i = 1, . . . , I such that u 0 = I i=1 α i u i − µ i v i + γe. To prove this, define the preference relation i over P by p i q ⇔ p ∼ i q, for all i = 1, . . . , I. We then have
) obviously satisfies Pareto preference, so by the same argument as in the proof of part (b) we obtain K * 0 ⊆ cl(
where the last equality follows from the fact that cone(U i ) − cone(U i ) is a subspace of R X and, hence, is closed. Hence for all u 0 ∈ U 0 , there exist γ ∈ R and u i , v i ∈ cone(U i ) for all i = 1, . . . , I such that
Moreover, for all i = 1, . . . , I, since U i is convex we also have u i = α i u i and v i = β i v i for some α i , β i ∈ R + and u i , v i ∈ U i and, On the closedness assumption in part (b) of the theorem As can be seen from the proof of part (b), the closedness assumption ensures that each social utility function can be expressed as a non-negative linear combination of some individual utility functions (and a constant function). Indeed, even though each cone(U i ) + {γe} γ∈R is closed, their sum is not necessarily closed in general. There are at least two cases, however, where the sum is guaranteed to be closed.
The first case is when each cone(U i ) + {γe} γ∈R is polyhedral (Rockafellar, 1970, Corrolary 19.3.2) . This is equivalent to the corresponding K i in the lemma above being polyhedral (Rockafellar, 1970, Corrolary 19.2.2) , and can be characterized by a finiteness axiom on i (Dubra and Ok, 2002) . Note that no closedness assumption is needed in part (a) because cone(U i ) + {γe} γ∈R is replaced with cone(U i ) − cone(U i ) + {γe} γ∈R , which is a subspace of R X and, hence, falls into this case.
The second case is when all K i 's have a common point in their relative interiors (Rockafellar, 1970, Corrolary 16.4.2) . This can be characterized by the following minimal agreement condition: there exist p, q ∈ P such that p * i q for all i ∈ I, where p * i q is defined by for all q i ∈ P such that p i q i , there exist q i ∈ P and λ i ∈ (0, 1) such that p i q i and q = λ i q i + (1 − λ i )q i . Note that if all i 's are complete then this condition boils down to the usual minimal agreement condition, where p * i q is replaced with p i q.
